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Despite the nuances that have emerged as a result of surrogacy arrangements, it would seem 
that this has been a common practice in many different parts of the world. Indeed, infertility 
has been considered an issue since the beginning of time thus, it is no shock that mankind 
worked towards developing means to remedy this problem.  
With the development of human assisted reproductive technologies, methods such as artificial 
insemination, IVF and surrogacy have become popular over the years. Many jurisdictions have 
been left to play catch-up to the developments in the medical field with some succeeding and 
others falling short. Surrogacy is on the increase in Kenya therefore discussions are underway 
to pass laws and policies that would sufficiently regulate the practice. 
This paper seeks to identify different legal regulations that have since emerged in various 
jurisdiction to answer questions specifically: 
a) Who should rightfully be recognised as the mother of a child born out of a surrogacy 
arrangement where the surrogate has no genetic link to the child she carries? 
b) What rights and responsibilities accrue to both the surrogate and intended parties? 
c) What legal process may be employed to recognise the intended parents as the legal 
parents of a child born out of this agreement? 
Chapter 1 seeks to identify the research problem and hypotheses, chapter 2 will outline the 
responses of various jurisdictions with the emergence of questions before the courts, chapter 3 
will embark on a comparative analysis of the laws in the UK, USA and Israel, chapter 4 will 
outline the Kenyan situation as it is and the shortcomings in the Assisted Reproductive 
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The Constitution of Kenya 2010 in Article 45 recognises the family as the natural and 
fundamental unit of society. It also underscores the fact that the family will enjoy state 
protection.1 Article 16 of the UDHR further reiterates this position and highlights the right of 
men and women of full age to marry and found a family without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion.2 
In pursuit of this right, many people all over the world have turned to methods of human 
assisted reproduction such as surrogacy, in-vitro fertilisation and artificial insemination. In 
Kenya, it is no different. Furthermore, Article 43 (1) (a) of the Constitution recognises the right 
to the highest attainable standard of healthcare (up to and including reproductive healthcare).3 
As a result, it has necessitated the review of the legal framework governing reproduction, and 
a re-evaluation of various presumptions that have existed concerning family and parenthood.  
The Reproductive Healthcare Bill 2014 makes an attempt at demystifying the concept of 
surrogacy. It provides for a surrogate parenthood agreement which is only valid where the 
conception of the child is effected by the use of the gametes of both or one of the 
commissioning parents (where there are sufficient biological, medical or other reasons).4 In 
general, it involves a situation where a woman makes a prior arrangement to carry a child with 
the intention that it will be handed over to someone else at birth.5 
In the case JLN & 2 others v The Director of Children’s Services & 2 others, the 2nd and 3rd 
petitioners were a couple who entered into a surrogacy agreement with the 1st petitioner. She 
gave birth to twins. The dispute revolved around which party should be registered as the mother 
in the twins’ birth notification.6 Under the Births and Deaths Registration Act, birth has been 
defined as “issuing forth of any child from its mother after the expiration of the 28th week of 
pregnancy, whether alive or dead.”7 
                                                          
1 Article 45, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
2 Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10th December 1948. 
3 Article 43, Constitution of Kenya. 
4 Section 10, Reproductive Healthcare Bill (Senate Bill No.17 of 2014). 
5 Department of Health, Review of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A Public Consultation (August 
2005) para 7. 
6 JLN & 2 others v The Director of Children’s Services & 2 others [2014] eklr. 




The court stated that in the event of a dispute, the Children’s court of the High Court may be 
called upon to give necessary direction as to who is to be registered as the parent by applying 
the principle of the best interest of the child in the absence of a legislative framework. 
In another case AMN & 2 others v AG & 5 others8 the same question arose concerning 
registration of twins born out of a surrogacy agreement. The Respondents relied on section 2 
of the Birth’s and Death’s Registration Act and the case Re G where Baroness Hale Richmond 
differentiates between genetic parenthood, gestational parenthood and psychological 
parenthood. It was argued that section 2 favours gestational parenthood therefore the one that 
carries the pregnancy to term and delivers the child is rightfully the child’s mother. Justice 
Lenaola accepted this position and ruled that the host woman is presumed in law to be the 
mother of the child though she may have no genetic link to the child. This remains the status 
until other legal processes are applied to transfer legal motherhood to the commissioning 
woman.   
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Ideally, the commissioning mother is still the biological parent of a child born out of a 
surrogacy arrangement. The current law in Kenya (specifically the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act) however favours gestational parenthood and the surrogate mother is 
recognised in law as the mother of a child born out of a surrogacy agreement. The emergence 
of surrogacy arrangements has suddenly created a situation where the presumption that the 
woman who gives birth to a child is the child’s mother, is rebuttable.  
1.3. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
While fatherhood may be undisputable, surrogacy arrangements have over time been perceived 
as a challenge to both the meaning of motherhood and family.9 This is largely based on the 
traditional notions of motherhood and the significance of the gestational mother’s contribution 
to the foetus growing inside her.10 For this reason, it is important that we evaluate the roles of 
both biological and gestational mothers to determine who should be recognised in law as the 
mother to a surrogate baby. 
                                                          
8 AMN & 2 others v AG & 5 others [2015] Eklr. 
9 Horsty K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ Child and Family Law 
Quarterly Volume 22 (2010), at 456. 
10 Sirola K, ‘Defending the Rights of Intended Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania’ 




At the same time, principles ought to be laid down so as to best determine legal motherhood in 
the event of disputed maternity. This can only begin once the law clearly establishes who 
rightfully assumes maternity. 
1.4. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
1) To determine who should be recognised by law as the mother of a child born out of a 
surrogacy agreement where the host has no genetic link with the child. 
2) To understand the rights and responsibilities arise for both the surrogate and the 
commissioning mother. 
3) To determine whether legal motherhood can be transferred by any other process besides 
adoption and if so, which process would be the most efficient. 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1) Who should be recognised by law as the mother of a child born out of a surrogacy 
agreement where the host has no genetic link with the child?  
2) What rights and responsibilities arise for both the surrogate and the commissioning 
mother?  
3) Can motherhood be legally transferred by other means besides adoption? If so which 
processes will be most efficient? 
1.6. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since this is an area that has largely been left to courts to adjudicate, most scholars have 
analysed the judgements of various courts to understand the principles applied as well as the 
rationale for their application.  
Courts have developed tests to determine maternal rights based on three components: under 
the genetic maternity rule, courts award maternal rights to the party who provided the genetic 
material for the child. Those in favour of this rule believe it provides a clear and fair 
determination of maternal rights. I.e. blood tests can determine with certainty if a genetic link 
exists between a mother and a child. Next is the gestational maternity rule which favours the 
birth mother. Arguments in favour of this rule are primarily based on recognition that an 
emotional and physical connection is developed between a mother and her child during 




of the surrogate and arranging party. It is largely dependent on the determination as to whether 
or not a surrogacy contract in existence is enforceable.11 
In an analysis of the case Johnson v Calvert that was adjudicated in the California Court of 
Appeal, Todd Krim looks at the court’s interpretation of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) that 
recognised both genetic motherhood and gestational motherhood. In this case under the UPA 
both the surrogate and commissioning mother had statutory claims to maternity. However, the 
court interpreted the UPA finding the blood test determination of maternity dispositive stating 
that a person must first prove through blood test evidence that she is genetically related to the 
child before she is considered the “natural mother”.12  
Frank Bewkes also looks into further jurisprudence by American courts in New Jersey. In one 
case, the woman’s ovum and the man’s sperm were combined to be implanted and gestated by 
the woman’s sister. The couple sought a pre-birth order declaring themselves the legal parents 
of the child. The court denied them the pre-birth order stating that the voluntary surrender of 
the child by the surrogate is only valid if carried out within 72 hours after the birth of the child. 
The 72 hour requirement was affirmed later in another case of similar nature. In New Jersey, 
the gestational surrogate was seen as a mother and the surrogacy arrangement, while allowed, 
was treated like an adoption.13 
A case has been made for the intent based rules with scholars arguing that intention 
encompasses the motivation to have a child, initiation and involvement in the procreative 
process and a commitment to nurture and care. Recognising intention is said to give families 
created through surrogacy or assisted conception protection against differential treatment of 
the infertile from the fertile. At the same time, surrogacy would not be treated as inferior to 
other assisted reproductive techniques in the hierarchy of family formation.14  
At the foundation of all other arguments lies the importance of ensuring that the best interest 
of the child remains paramount. However, Kelly Oliver argues that the way “best interest of 
the child” is determined in courts almost always guarantees that the contracting party gets 
                                                          
11 Hisano E, ‘Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes: Refocusing on the Child’ Lewis and Clark Law Review 
(2011) 541-543. 
12 Krim T, ‘BeyondBaby M: International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary 
Biological Mother’ Annals of Health Law (1996) 203. 
13 Bewkes F, ‘Surrogate or mother? The Problem of Traditional Surrogacy’ Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender & 
Social Justice (2014) 152. 
14 Horsty K, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ Child and Family Law 




custody of the child. Having agreed to give up her child, the court most likely already finds the 
surrogate an unfit mother. Perhaps the greatest influencing factor is the financial security of 
the disputing factors. Since the contracting party in most cases is paying for the services of the 
surrogate, then it is more likely that they are financially secure.15 
Bearing all this in mind, it is clear that there is no established regime/standard to be followed 
in determining motherhood. Even then, the courts in their interpretation and application of the 
principle of the best interest of the child overlooks many other factors that may be of 
importance in determining maternal rights. 
1.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Many feminists have welcomed contract pregnancy as a way to illustrate that childbearing and 
child rearing are two distinct human functions. Motherhood has often been taken as women’s 
preeminent characteristic but with surrogacy, it is emphasized that not all women who bear 
children need to be thought of as mothers. Thus, the gestational mother’s obligation to 
relinquish the child she bore for the commissioning party is an expression of her freedom to 
undertake whatever work she chooses. It is argued that the refusal to acknowledge the legal 
validity of surrogacy arrangements implies that women are not competent to act as rational, 
moral agents regarding their reproductive activity.16   
Under the labour theory, entitlement to an object flows directly from the productive labor that 
a person puts into an object. According to this theory, legal parenthood should be awarded to 
the one who has invested the most in the developing foetus. Taking this into account, the 
gestational mother is assumed to be most deserving of parenthood.17 
Lastly, there is the parity principle. This principle argues that mothers and fathers have parity 
as far as parenthood is concerned. Some argue that claims of fatherhood originate in the genetic 
contribution that fathers make to their children. In the same spirit, then, it would be wrong to 
state that motherhood originates in the gestational purposes. Motherhood should also be 
awarded on account of the genetic link between a woman and the foetus.18  
                                                          
15 Oliver K, ‘ Marxism and Surrogacy’ Hypatia Inc & Wiley, Ethics and Reproduction (1989) 100. 
16 Shanley M, ‘Surrogate Mothering and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of Contracts for Human Reproduction’ 
Chicago Journals (1993) 620. 
17 Gillers S, ’A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood’ Yale Law Journal (2000) 706.  
18 Bayne T & Kolers A, ‘Are You my Mommy? On the Genetic Basis of Parenthood’ Journal of Applied 





A surrogacy agreement is not meant to confer full maternal rights to the host mother. 
The biological mother/commissioning mother is the one that ought to be recognised as the legal 
parent of a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement rather than the host/surrogate mother. 
1.9. RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY 
An enormous amount of research has been carried out on surrogacy in many different 
jurisdictions. Research studies carried out by various scholars in books, journals and 
periodicals will provide the information required to fully address the research problem. 
Mass media will also provide information especially with regard to discussions on surrogacy 
in Kenya through newspaper publications and magazines. 
I intend to carry out a comparative study of the United Kingdom, the United States and Israel. 
Legislation in the UK recognises the gestational maternity rule. Israel recognises and enforces 
surrogacy contracts while recognising the genetic maternity rule. The USA is a hybrid system 
applying all 3 rules on a case by case basis. It would be important to understand how the 
systems work in the different jurisdictions. 
1.10. LIMITATIONS 
Although most of the research is to be undertaken through online sources, these are of a limited 
nature especially with regard to primary sources. Some websites do not grant free access to 
their material. At the same time, certain key authors require that their articles and ebooks are 








1.11. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Chapter 1 Research proposal: Outlines the research to 
be undertaken, reasons why and how it shall 
be carried out. 
Chapter 2 History and theoretical framework: Outlines 
the development of surrogacy from legal 
perspective throughout in the UK, USA and 
Israel.  
Chapter 3 Comparative analysis: Undertakes to 
compare and contrast how surrogacy has 
been regulated in the UK, USA and Israel.  
Chapter 4  Identifies Kenya’s situation and current 
position on surrogacy, the shortcomings in 
regulation and what could be borrowed from 
the USA, UK and Israel.  
Chapter 5 Recommendations and conclusions: 
Proposes solutions to improve the regulation 





1.12. TIMELINE/DURATION FOR COMPLETION OF DISSERTATION 
TASK DATE OF COMPLETION 
Proposal writing 24th February 2016 
Data collection and research End of November 









This chapter will briefly highlight the practice of surrogacy in early civilizations. It shall also 
review the extent to which various states have legislated on surrogacy i.e. the USA, UK and 
Israel, while looking at the practice of surrogacy in Kenya, both under traditional African 
society and since the advent of human assisted reproduction. 
Lastly, this chapter shall also attempt to discuss the theoretical framework underpinning the 
arguments concerning who between a commissioning mother and the surrogate should be 
recognized legally as the mother of a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement.  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As previously defined, surrogacy is an arrangement where a woman agrees to carry a pregnancy 
on behalf of another woman (and her spouse) with the intention that once the child is born the 
commissioning parents would be recognized as the child’s parents.19 The concept of surrogacy 
could further be split into partial surrogacy (also known as straight or traditional surrogacy) or 
full surrogacy (known as host or gestational).20 The former involves the taking of sperm from 
the intended father and an egg from the surrogate while the latter involves the implantation of 
an embryo created either using21 – 
a) The egg and sperm of the intended parents, 
b) A donated egg fertilised with the intended father’s sperm, or 
c) An embryo created using the egg and sperm that have both been donated. 
Before the discovery and development of modern assisted reproductive techniques, surrogacy 
by natural conception was the only way to help barren women to have children. This shall be 
illustrated more in the next section.  
  
                                                          
19 - http://www.thefreedictionary.com/surrogate+mother on 12 December 2016. 
20 - < http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-options-surrogacy.html> on 12 December 2016. 




2.2. THE PRACTICE OF SURROGACY IN EARLY CIVILIZATION 
Perhaps the most significant surrogacy arrangement throughout history was that between 
Abram, Sarai and Hagar with Abraham being the patriarch of the canonical religions. Abram’s 
wife Sarai was barren. They were becoming advanced in age and Sarai still hadn’t born Abram 
any children. Sarai had an Egyptian maidservant known as Hagar whom she offered to Abram 
to be his wife in order that she may have children on Sarai’s behalf. Hagar conceived and later 
gave birth to a son, Ishmael.22 
History records that Mesopotamia also practiced surrogacy with Hammurabi’s code being 
among the first to legally recognize it. Hammurabi’s code was drawn up in 1780 and the 
document permitted an infertile woman who wished to have an offspring to find a 
“bondwoman” for her husband.23 Where the bondwoman failed to have a male child, then an 
additional bondwoman would be taken for this purpose. The practice could also be traced back 
to Ancient China. A man would ‘borrow a woman’s belly’ in order to produce offspring for 
purposes of continuing his family line.24 
The same was the case around different parts of Africa. Marriage as a practice was and still is 
highly regarded within African society, 25with it being largely associated with child bearing to 
ensure continuity in each community.26 In the case of infertility, the most common “remedy” 
was polygamy thus surrogacy was practiced within this context. The fear of extinction for 
communities encouraged high procreation27 and in the event that a woman was infertile, the 
institution of polygamy would ensure that high fertility and child bearing rates were sustained. 
Subsequent wives in a marital arrangement would bear children on behalf of the wife that had 
been unable to do so. Continuity was therefore guaranteed.  
These are just but a few general examples of the existence of surrogacy within early societies. 
As it shall be seen later, disputes that have risen within the Kenyan courts point towards other 
                                                          
22Genesis 16, The Bible, 4th edition, Zondervan publishers, Michigan USA, 2005, 14. 
23 http://surrogacy.ru/eng/history/ on 13 December 2016.  
24 Ding C, ‘Surrogacy litigation in China and beyond’ Volume 2, Journal of Law and Biosciences, Issue No 2, 
2015, 33.  
25 Hertrich V and Pilon M, ‘Changing patterns of marriage in Africa’ CEPED News, December 1998 - 
http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_7/b_fdi_57-58/010025047.pdf on 13 
December 2016. 
26 Hertrich V and Pilon M, ‘Changing patterns of marriage in Africa’ 2. 
27 Khadiagala G M and Bigombe B, ‘Major trends affecting families in sub Saharan Africa’ 1990, 1 - < 




“unusual” surrogacy arrangements that seemingly continue to exist within various Kenyan 
communities.  
2.3. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SURROGACY IN THE UK, USA AND 
ISRAEL 
2.3.1. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Surrogacy in the UK wasn’t publicised much until 1985 in the Baby Cotton Case (Re C: A 
Minor).28 The plaintiffs were a husband and wife who had been married for several years but 
had been unable to have children. In 1983, the husband contracted with an agency in America 
that found a surrogate to bear his child for a small fee. The surrogate was inseminated and 
shortly after she conceived. The child was born in a hospital in England on January of 1985 
and was left by the birth mother in the care of the hospital until the plaintiffs collected her. The 
husband commenced proceedings to have the care and control of the child committed to him 
and his wife. The court found that the birth mother had voluntarily relinquished custody of her 
child. The plaintiffs appeared to be suitable parents for the child and both wanted her. The court 
therefore handed custody of the child to them.  
Before this case was heard, the Warnock Committee had been established in 1982 to look into 
the ethical implications of developments in human reproduction.29 Generally, the committee 
was charged with the responsibility to consider developments that had taken place and those 
likely to be seen in medicine and science with regard to human fertilization and embryology, 
to consider the policies and safeguards to be applied and to make the necessary 
recommendations.30 The committee recognized that infertility had become a problem that 
seemed to be in the increase among many citizens in the UK. Members went ahead to propose 
various solutions aimed at alleviating infertility with surrogacy featuring as one such solution.  
The committee established various circumstances under which surrogacy ought to be an option 
for the alleviation of infertility.31 These included: 
a) Cases of severe pelvic disease that couldn’t be treated surgically. 
b) Where the intending mother had no uterus. 
                                                          
28 Baby Cotton Case (Re C: A Minor) (1985), Family Law Court of the UK. 
29 Horsey K and Sheldon S, ‘Still hazy after all these years: The law regulating surrogacy’ Medical Law Review, 
Issue No 20, 2012, 69. 
30 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, July 1984, 4. 





c) Where the intending parents had suffered repeated miscarriages. 
d) Where the intending mother stood to benefit more from the surrogacy arrangement 
although she may not have been infertile. E.g. she suffers from a condition that makes 
pregnancy medically undesirable.  
The possibility of persons misusing the right to surrogacy for purposes of convenience was 
also raised. The committee took a firm approach noting that this was not only unethical but 
was also completely unacceptable.32 
Surrogacy as a general practice wasn’t rendered unlawful. It was also presumed that in majority 
of the cases, the terms and conditions made between parties to a surrogacy agreement would 
be kept. However, it would be unwise to ignore that there was a possibility that disputes could 
arise and such disputes were likely to present serious complications.33 Worse yet, with regard 
to parenthood, it was clear that the position in surrogacy arrangements was less straightforward. 
The committee took the same approach as was adopted in relation to egg donation concerning 
the determination of motherhood, wherein, whomever gives birth to the child (for all purposes 
of the law) was to be regarded as the mother of the child.34 
The greatest recommendation by the committee was for the introduction of legislation to ensure 
criminal liability is impugned against persons that may be party to surrogacy arrangements for 
the sole purpose of commercial benefit.35 It was against this backdrop that the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act of 1985 was enacted. 
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act was a short Act whose provisions mainly covered the 
definition of a surrogate and surrogacy arrangement,36 prohibited the negotiation of surrogacy 
arrangements on a commercial basis,37 and identified the publication of any advertisements for 
purposes of surrogacy arrangements as criminal.38 Lastly, it outlined the criminal sanctions for 
persons found guilty of any offences mentioned in the Act.39 It was clear from the onset that 
                                                          
32 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 42. 
33 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 45. 
34 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 44. 
35 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 46. 
36 Section 1, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 
37 Section 2, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 
38 Section 3, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 




this Act was insufficient and incapable of dealing with issues that could be foreseen to arise as 
the practice of surrogacy continued to expand throughout the UK. 
The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act was enacted thereafter in 1990. The HFEA 
established the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority whose function was to issue 
licenses to carry out treatment, storage and research concerning reproductive health40 (among 
other things). The HFEA directly addressed questions on parentage under sections 27 and 28. 
In describing the “mother” section 2741 states: 
The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo 
or sperm and eggs, or artificial insemination, and no other woman, is to be treated as the 
mother of the child. 
Section 2842 in describing a “father” in such an arrangement suggests: 
Where a woman carries a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or sperm and 
eggs or artificial insemination – 
a) If she is party to a marriage at the time the embryo was placed in her or she was 
artificially inseminated and, 
b) The creation of the embryo carried by her wasn’t brought about with the sperm of the 
other party to the marriage, 
The other party to the marriage shall be treated as the father of the child unless it is shown 
that he didn’t consent to the placing of the embryo in her. 
The Act proceeds to say that once fatherhood has been established under these conditions no 
other person may be treated as the father of the child in question. Section 30 of HFEA set up 
parental orders43  and clearly outlines who may obtain them, under what conditions a parental 
order may be sought and the procedure to be followed to acquire one.  
The HFEA underwent its first review in 1997 this review being spearheaded by Professor 
Margaret Brazier. The main issues for determination by the Brazier Review44 were: 
1. Whether surrogate mothers should be allowed to receive payment. 
                                                          
40 Section 5, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 37 of 1990). 
41 Section 27, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 
42 Section 28, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 
43 Section 30, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (Chapter 49 of 1985). 





2. Whether a special agency should be established to oversee and regulate surrogacy 
arrangements. 
3. Whether the findings concerning these issues would require that existing legislation 
needs to change to pave way for new legislation. 
The Brazier Review concluded its report and made recommendations majority of which were 
not implemented. What came out clearly was that the HFEA was still inadequate when it came 
to substantively covering matters on surrogacy. This paved the way for yet another review 
process between 2004 and 2007. 
One of the major discussions surrounding the 2004-2007 review process was the question 
regarding the enlargement of the scope of legal parenthood in an attempt to include same sex 
couples, persons in civil unions and other “non-traditional” partnerships.45 Ultimately the 
review process paid off and the 1990 HFEA was replaced by the 2008 Act. Questions on legal 
parenthood are addressed in sections 33 to 47. Even though the notion of legal parenthood has 
been expanded, the Act’s approach to the question of motherhood remains the same as that 
contained within the 1990 Act.46 
 2.3.2. THE USA 
The first case to draw attention to the surrogacy debate in the USA was Re Baby M47 decided 
in 1988 by the New Jersey Supreme Court. William and Elizabeth Stern were a couple living 
in New Jersey that had been unable to have a child owing to Elizabeth’s infertility. Mr. Stern 
and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract which Mr Richard Whitehead 
(Mary Beth’s husband) consented to. 
Mrs. Whitehead was to be impregnated through artificial insemination using Mr Stern’s sperm. 
She would then carry the pregnancy to term, deliver the baby and thereafter terminate her 
maternal rights to enable Mrs Stern to adopt the child. Mr Stern was to pay Mrs Whitehead     
$ 10,000 once the baby was born and delivered to him. On March 27th 1986, Baby M was 
born.  
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Having no intention to disclose to hospital officials the existence of the surrogacy arrangement, 
Mr and Mrs Whitehead assumed the position of the child’s legal parents. Her birth certificate 
indicated the same and she was given the name Sara Elizabeth Whitehead. 
Shortly after the baby was born, Mrs Whitehead realized that she couldn’t part with the child. 
When the Stern’s visited her and the baby at the hospital it was alleged that she seemed to 
convey the same. Nevertheless, on March 30th she handed over the baby. The next day, she 
returned to the Stern’s residence where she told them that she couldn’t live without her baby. 
She requested to have the child only for a week after which she would surrender her. This 
didn’t happen. In fact the child was not returned until four months later after being forcibly 
taken from the Whiteheads. The bulk of the issue discussed by the court was hinged on 
determining which parenting arrangement was most compatible with the child’s best interest. 
The Supreme Court found that statutes in New Jersey that determined maternity or paternity 
were to be applied. Therefore, where the surrogate was both the genetic and birth mother, she 
was the child’s sole legal mother. As a result, an agreement requiring a surrogate to relinquish 
her maternal rights to the intended mother were deemed to be unenforceable and contrary to 
public policy.  
In the USA, surrogacy is governed at the state level thus it is an area of law largely regulated 
by federal governments. In response to the Baby M case, a number of state legislatures passed 
laws that prohibited surrogacy altogether, in an attempt to ensure that a similar scenario 
wouldn’t occur again.48 Surrogacy contracts were rendered void and considered a violation of 
public policy. Arizona, New York and Michigan led the way with New York not only 
prohibiting surrogacy but also adding a “no compensation” provision. Columbia and 
Washington DC followed, the latter went a step further by criminalizing any kind of surrogacy 
agreement altogether.49 
A study carried out by Columbia law school sought to analyse the status of state surrogacy laws 
and policies as of May 2016. Evidently, the results of the report point towards a diverse 
approach to this subject matter. However, the general trend has been towards legalization. 
States such as New York, New Jersey, Michigan and Indiana still expressly prohibit the 
practice.50 Despite the prohibitions, discussions appeared to be underway in New York in 
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particular concerning lifting the ban. There has been a proposed Child-Parent Security Act that 
if passed would see surrogacy become legal in New York. Various other states haven’t fully 
legalized surrogacy. Seemingly, the states with the most progressive laws are California, 
Florida and Virginia.51 
In California, surrogacy is governed by the Uniform Parentage Act. This Act was first enacted 
in 1973 to address the status of children born out of wedlock52 but has since evolved to cover 
conceptions and births that have occurred as a result of assisted human reproductive methods. 
With regard to parent-child relationships, the UPA states that: 
The parent and child relationship may be established as follows: 
a) Between a child and the natural mother, it may be established by proof of her having 
given birth to the child.53 
In the case of assisted reproduction, the UPA makes a clear distinction between a gestational 
carrier and the intended parents. It defines a ‘gestational carrier’ as:  
A woman who is not an intended parent and who agrees to gestate an embryo that is genetically 
unrelated to her pursuant to an assisted reproductive agreement.54 
On the other hand an ‘intended parent’ has been defined as: 
An individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent to be legally bound as the parent 
of a child resulting from assisted reproduction.55 
In a general sense, the UPA’s distinction of the gestational carrier and intended parent shows 
the state’s appreciation of the fact that motherhood cannot only be determined on the basis of 
gestation. Doing so would not only risk the best interest of the child but would also infringe on 
the parties’ rights to reproductive treatment.  As shall be discussed in subsequent sections of 
this paper, the UPA has prescribed procedures that make it possible for the intended parents to 
be recognized as the legal parents of a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement. 
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In Florida, issues on determination of parentage fall within the statute on domestic relations. It 
states: 
Except in the case of gestational surrogacy, any child born within wedlock who has been 
conceived by the means of artificial or in vitro insemination is irrebuttably presumed to be the 
child of the husband and wife, provided that both husband and wife have consented in writing 
to the artificial or in vitro insemination.56 
Prima facie, this could be taken to mean that the presumption of motherhood on account of 
gestation is a rebuttable one in cases where the conception was effected through gestational 
surrogacy. 
Last is Virginia’s Code on the Status of Children of Assisted Conception. It states that: 
…The parentage of any child resulting from the performance of assisted conception can be 
determined as follows: 
1) The gestational mother of a child is the child’s mother.57 
Further determination of parenthood is based on the status of the contract that was in place 
between the intending parents and the surrogate. Where the contract was court approved then 
intended parents assume legal parenthood.58 However, where the contract was not approved by 
the court the gestational mother will be recognized as the child’s legal parent unless the 
intended mother is a genetic parent.59 
From the foregoing, one can conclude that USA legislation neither favours gestational nor 
genetic parenthood.  
2.3.3. ISRAEL 
Israeli society places great emphasis on the family. The Jewish command “be fruitful and 
multiply” together with the occurrence of the Holocaust has contributed to the notion that child 
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bearing is a major contribution to national growth and development, if only to ensure continuity 
of the Jewish people.60 
The aftermath of the Baby M case was not only felt in the USA but also in Israel. The Israeli 
government went ahead to install public health regulations that explicitly banned surrogacy.61 
Shortly after, cases emerged concerning surrogacy arrangements that made it necessary for the 
Israeli Parliament to put together a law that would govern surrogacy. 
Nachmani v Nachmani62 was one such case that created the push for surrogacy legislation. Mr 
and Mrs Nahmani were married in 1984. They underwent fertility treatment three years later, 
a time during which Mrs Nahmani was diagnosed with uterine cancer. She had to have her 
womb surgically removed. When she recovered from surgery, the couple wished to undergo 
IVF treatment and have Mrs Nahmani’s eggs fertilised by Mr Nahmani’s sperm and 
subsequently transplanted into a surrogate mother’s uterus. Surrogacy was not legal at the time 
in Israel thus the couple opted to appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel and in 1991 they were 
granted the right to undergo IVF treatment within the public healthcare system.  
Mrs Nachmani planned to meet with a surrogate in the US but just before the trip her husband 
left her for another woman. By this time, the couple had undergone several treatment cycles 
and had generated 11 fertilised eggs that were cryopreserved. In May of 1992, Mr Nahmani 
wrote to both the clinics in Israel and Los Angeles withdrawing his consent. The case proceeded 
to various courts and the decision was appealed several times with Mrs Nahmani claiming that 
she had a right to have the procedure carried out since this was the only way she could possibly 
become a mother. 
By this time, a public committee had been set up by the Ministry of Health and Justice in Israel 
charge with the responsibility of preparing a proposal for legislation on in vitro fertilisation 
and surrogacy arrangements. There was also an outcry from Israeli citizens and in 1995, 25 
couples petitioned the High Court to have the ban on surrogacy lifted. Thus in 1996, the Law 
of Agreements for the Carrying of Foetuses (hereinafter referred to as the Surrogate 
Agreements Law) was born.63 
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The law in Israel provides that full surrogacy is only permissible in cases where both male and 
female gametes come from the commissioning parents who ideally must be a married couple. 
However, before the birth of the child, Israeli social workers are involved in order to transfer 
parentage to the intended couple through adoption.64 The stance in Israel is almost similar to 
that in the USA. Both genetic and gestational parentage are recognized. What differs are the 
processes by which parenthood is transferred. 
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The general position in the previous chapter points towards the acknowledgment of both 
genetic and gestational functions of mothers. Throughout history, the duty of a mother to 
endure pregnancy, deliver her child and ultimately raise him/her weren’t viewed as 
independent. The emergence of surrogacy saw the separation of these functions, all of which 
are of importance to the development of a child from the time of conception. Although biology 
and genetic links are important in the determination of motherhood, the process of pregnancy 
and delivery are also worth acknowledging and safeguarding by legal means.  
While America and Israel recognize the intended parents as those with a rightful claim over 
the parentage of a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement, their governments have still 
deemed it necessary to put in place processes that will confer legal parentage that are 
recognizable and open to protection by the state. This chapter will embark on a comparative 
analysis of the three jurisdictions (the UK, USA and Israel) and the manner in which they have 
approached the regulation of surrogacy so as to uphold their state’s definition of motherhood 
while giving it legal basis. This will be looked at in two limbs: 
a) The validity and recognition of surrogacy contracts as well as the rights and 
duties/obligations that accrue to both the surrogate and the intending parents based on 
the contracts and statute. 
b) The use of pre-birth or parental orders to formally recognize the genetic mother as 
opposed to the surrogate/gestational carrier. 
3.1. SURROGACY CONTRACTS/AGREEMENTS 
Contract law generally concerns obligations that people owe to others as a result of the relations 
and transactions in which they became involved. The obligations are usually self-imposed.65 
Broadly speaking, the need for contract law could be justified by two major reasons; first, to 
facilitate the making and performing of deferred exchanges (ensuring the protection of 
economic interests in most cases). The second is a moral theory that primarily focuses on the 
rights and duties of individual contracting parties. Remedies offered under contract law correct 
any injustices that are likely occur as a result of one party’s default on their obligations.66 The 
contract making process undergoes various stages and involves the meeting of minds to agree 
on certain terms and conditions that may be express or implied but remain essential to the 
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performance of the contract. In most cases, contractual terms are the basis of disputes between 
parties to a contract.67 
Based on this assertion, it is evident why Israel and the United States chose the contractual 
model for regulating surrogacy contracts. Enforcement of contracts is relatively easier where 
the parties have expressly stated their intentions. In the case of surrogacy, informal agreements 
have proven problematic to enforce in instances where either party has breached its obligations.  
In the UK, the HFEA doesn’t make direct reference to surrogacy contracts/agreements. 
However, it sets up the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority which has been given 
the mandate to grant licenses to specific institutions and medical facilities for the use and 
storage of gametes intended for assisted reproductive processes.68 It would appear that the only 
stamp of validity for any surrogacy agreement is in its being undertaken at a licensed facility. 
This approach has been taken since the HFEA makes it clear that the gestational carrier (the 
surrogate) is still legally recognized as the mother of the child whether she is genetically related 
to the child or not69 until a parental order has been obtained.  
American states are different altogether. Statutes expressly state their recognition of surrogacy 
contracts and go ahead to outline basic terms and conditions that must be adhered to prior to 
the making of the contract or those that are paramount to ensuring that the contract will be 
deemed valid if an issue was brought before a court of law. Florida’s statute70 states: 
1) Prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and enforceable gestational 
surrogacy contract shall be made between the commissioning couple and the 
gestational surrogate. A contract for gestational surrogacy shall not be binding and 
enforceable unless the gestational surrogate is 18 years of age or older and the 
commissioning couple are legally married and are both 18 years of age or older. 
2) The commissioning couple shall enter into a contract with a gestational surrogate only 
when, within reasonable medical certainty as determined by a licensed physician: 
a) The commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term; 
b) The gestation will cause a risk to the physical health of the commissioning 
mother; or 
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c) The gestation will cause a risk to the health of the foetus. 
3) A gestational surrogacy contract must include the following provisions: 
a) The commissioning couple agrees that the gestational surrogate shall be the sole 
source of consent with respect to clinical intervention and management of the 
pregnancy 
b) The gestational surrogate agrees to submit to reasonable medical evaluation and 
treatment and to adhere to reasonable medical instructions about her prenatal 
health. 
c) Except as provided in (e) the surrogate agrees to relinquish any parental rights 
upon the child’s birth and to proceed with the necessary judicial proceedings. 
d) Except as provided in (e) the commissioning couple agrees to accept custody of and 
to assume full parental rights and responsibilities for the child immediately upon 
the child’s birth, regardless of any impairment of the child. 
e) The gestational surrogate agrees to assume parental rights and responsibilities for 
the child born to her if it is determined that neither member of the commissioning 
couple is the genetic parent of the child. 
4) As part of the contract, the commissioning couple may agree to pay only reasonable 
living, legal, medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses of the gestational 
surrogate that are directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal periods. 
California’s code refers to surrogacy contracts as assisted reproduction agreements for 
gestational carriers. Each agreement is required to have details including but not limited to - 
the date on which the agreement was executed, the persons from whom the gametes originated 
unless they are anonymous and the identity of the intended parents.71 Furthermore, it requires 
that it is made in writing and that prior to the execution of the agreement, both the surrogate 
and the intended parents must be represented by separate legal counsel.72 The agreement must 
be executed by the parties and their signatures notarized or duly witnessed.73 Until all these 
requirements are met, no procedure for treatment may commence.74 Finally, the agreement is 
to be presented before a superior court after which it will be taken as evidence rebutting any 
presumption that the gestational carrier and her spouse are the legal parents of the child born.75 
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Thus, the existence of a court approved contract is proof that the legal parents are in fact the 
intended parents.  
Virginia’s code also adopts the use of court approved contracts. It reads: 
A surrogate, her husband, if any, and prospective intended parents may enter into a written 
agreement whereby the surrogate may relinquish all her rights and duties as parent of a child 
conceived through assisted conception, and the intended parents may become the parents of 
the child.76 
It goes ahead to outline the process by which the contract may be approved by the court. 
First, the intended parents, surrogate and her husband are required to file a joint petition at the 
circuit or city court where at least one of them resides. The contract is to be signed and 
acknowledged by a person authorized by law to make such acknowledgment. A copy of the 
contract is to be attached to the petition after which the court will proceed to appoint a guardian 
ad litem to represent the child’s interests as well as a counsel to represent the surrogate. The 
court is expected to order a home study to be carried out by a local department of social services 
or a licensed child placing agency. After this, the court enters an order approving the surrogacy 
contract, and authorizing the performance of assisted conception for a period of twelve months 
after the date of the order, and may discharge the guardian ad litem and attorney for the 
surrogate. 
Some of the conditions for the discharge of the guardian ad litem and the surrogate’s attorney 
are77: 
a) The intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband, if any, meet the standards of 
fitness applicable to adoptive parents. 
b) All the parties have voluntarily entered into the surrogacy contract and understand its 
terms and the nature, meaning, and effect of the proceeding. 
c) The agreement contains adequate provisions to guarantee the payment of reasonable 
medical and ancillary costs either in the form of insurance or other arrangements that 
are satisfactory to the parties.  
d) The surrogate has had at least one pregnancy, and has experienced at least one live 
birth, and bearing another child does not pose an unreasonable risk to her physical or 
mental health or to that of any resulting child (a finding which must be supported by 
medical evidence). 
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e) Prior to signing the surrogacy contract, the intended parents, the surrogate, and her 
husband, if any, have submitted to physical examinations and psychological evaluations 
by practitioners licensed to perform such services. 
f) The intended mother is infertile, is unable to bear a child, or is unable to do so without 
unreasonable risk to the unborn child or to the physical or mental health of the intended 
mother or the child (must also be supported by medical evidence). 
g) All parties have received counselling concerning the effects of the surrogacy by a 
qualified health care professional or social worker, and a report containing conclusions 
about the capacity of the parties to enter into and fulfil the agreement has been filed 
with the court. 
h) The husband of the surrogate is party to the agreement. 
i) At least one of the intended parents is expected to be the genetic parent of any child 
resulting from the agreement. 
All in all, in demanding that these conditions are met before contracts are approved, legislators 
and courts strive to achieve a balance between the rights of commissioning parents and those 
of the surrogate mother and her spouse (in cases where she is married). 
3.1.1. THE PLACE OF FORMAL CONTRACTS IN SAFEGUARDING THE 
INTERESTS OF THE SURROGATE AND THE CHILD 
Before, people seemed comfortable with the idea of having informal agreements. However, 
recent incidences in the international scene show why surrogacy contracts may be the best way 
to ensure that the rights of both surrogates and the children themselves is important. 
The Baby Gammy Case78was one that recently caught the attention of members of the public 
and media houses around the globe. A 21 year old lady from Thailand entered into a surrogacy 
arrangement with an Australian couple who could not have a child. Having been faced with 
financial constraints, her husband encouraged her to be a surrogate since she would be paid. 
She became pregnant with twins via IVF and four months into the pregnancy doctors informed 
her and the intended parents that one of the children had Down’s syndrome. It was alleged that 
the intended parents asked her to have an abortion to which she declined stating religious 
reasons. At birth, Baby Gammy not only had Down’s syndrome but was also diagnosed with a 
congenital heart problem. The Australian couple opted to take the baby’s twin leaving Baby 
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Gammy under the care of his surrogate mother who undoubtedly was unable to bear the burden 
of his medical treatment and upbringing.79 Before this case, there was no law regulating 
surrogacy arrangements in Thailand. This has since changed with the Thai Government 
introducing the Protection for Children Born Through Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
Act. The Act requires (among other things) that a written agreement is made between the 
surrogate and intended parents before pregnancy stating expressly that the intended parents 
would assume legal responsibility of the child once born. It also contains a clause to the effect 
that the legal parents cannot deny the parentage of the child. 80 
Concerns have also been raised on the lack of regulation and rampant commodification of 
surrogacy in India. The situation clearly outlines the reality of the exploitation that surrogates 
undergo to the extent that this phenomenon is now dubbed “medical tourism”. Over 350 clinics 
in India offer fertility services. Unlike in most other jurisdictions, fertility treatments are 
reported to cost between $12,000 and $20,000 while in America for example it costs upwards 
of $70,000.81 Aside from the relatively cheap cost, clinics recruit surrogates from very poor 
rural areas, most of whom are illiterate thus even if they were to have contracts, they would be 
unable to understand their terms.82 Scholars have raised the alarm on how this recruitment 
process is slowly becoming similar to processes used in human trafficking. 
From these two scenarios, one can see the difficulties that can arise out of informal 
arrangements. It would be in Baby Gammy’s best interest to have been taken along with his 
twin sister. Certainly, the Australian couple was in a much better financial position to care for 
him despite his birth defects. The situation has also been very unfair on the Thai surrogate who 
is now left with responsibility over a child she hadn’t anticipated and who isn’t related to her 
genetically. Where statute requires that contracts contain certain fundamental provisions for 
the protection of the surrogate and the child, it is easier for rights to be enforced in case of any 
violation. If Thailand’s law had been in existence by then, the likelihood is that the outcome of 
this case might have been different. 
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3.2. TRANSFER OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD: PRE-BIRTH ORDERS VERSUS 
PARENTAL ORDERS 
3.2.1. THE UK’S PARENTAL ORDERS 
In UK law, the position remains that until a parental order is granted, the surrogate and her 
spouse or civil partner retain legal and parental responsibility over the child.83 The HFEA 
highlights various conditions that must be met before a parental order is granted. First, the 
gametes of at least one of the applicants must have been used to bring about the creation of the 
embryo.84 The applicants must be husband and wife or civil partners85 and the application must 
be made within 6 months from the child’s date of birth.86 Both applicants must be above 18 
years.87 The child’s home must be with the applicants at the time the application is being filed88 
and no money or benefit ought to have been paid to the surrogate save for reasonable expenses.  
The application process is governed by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental 
Orders) Regulations. These regulations borrow heavily from UK adoption laws and procedures 
with minor modifications. 
The administration of parental orders is largely left to parental order reporters who work in 
collaboration with the courts. Their duties are threefold: to investigate the surrogacy 
arrangement including the financial agreement between the intended parents and the surrogate, 
inspect the welfare of the child and prepare a report to be submitted to the court detailing 
whether or not granting the order would be in the child’s best interest in the immediate and 
future term.89  
3.2.2. THE USA 
Federal governments in the USA confer parenthood on the intended parents by different means. 
California favours the use of pre-birth orders whereas Florida and Virginia allow such transfer 
of parenthood only after the child has been born. 
                                                          
83 Crawshaw M, Purewal S and Van den Akker O, ‘Working at the Margins: The Views and Experiences of Court 
Social Workers on Parental Orders Work in Surrogacy Arrangements’ Volume 43, British Journal of Social Work, 
2012, 1227.  
84 Section 54 (1) (b), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 22 of 2008). 
85 Section 54 (2), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 22 of 2008). 
86 Section 54 (3), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 22 of 2008). 
87 Section 54 (5), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 22 of 2008). 
88 Section 54 (4) (a), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Chapter 22 of 2008).  
89 Crawshaw M, Purewal S and Van den Akker O, ‘Working at the Margins: The Views and Experiences of Court 




In Florida, commissioning couples can file and an application before the court to obtain an 
expedited affirmation of parental status within 3 days from the birth of the child.90 Thereafter 
the court will fix a time and place for hearing the petition91 and notice of the hearing shall be 
given to the gestational surrogate, the physician administering fertility treatment and any party 
claiming paternity.92 
Once the court determines that there is a binding and enforceable gestational surrogacy 
contract, an order shall be entered stating that the intended parents are the legal parents of the 
child. Within 30 days a statement shall be prepared ordering the Department of Health to issue 
a new birth certificate naming the commissioning couple as the child’s parents.93 
Virginia’s Code provides that within 7 days of the birth of the child, intended parents are to file 
a written notice before the court. Once this notice has been filed and it has been reasonably 
evidenced that at least one of the intended parents is a genetic parent of the child the court will 
enter an order directing the State Registrar of Vital Records to issue a new birth certificate 
naming the intended parents as the legal parents of the child.94 
Under California’s Code, an action to establish the parent-child relationship between the 
intended parents and the child may be filed before the child’s birth and may be filed either in 
the county where the child is anticipated to be born, the county where the assisted reproduction 
agreement was executed or the county where the medical procedures were to be performed 
pursuant to the agreements.95 A copy of the assisted reproductive agreement is to be lodged 
with the court as well. The court will then issue an order establishing the parent-child 
relationship with the intended parents as identified in the surrogacy agreement.96 
Scholars have argued in favour of pre-birth orders particularly in cases where the gestational 
carrier has no genetic tie with the child she is carrying citing various benefits97: 
a) The intended parents are determined to be the legal parents of the child before the 
child’s birth. This gives them immediate and sole access to and control over the child 
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and its postnatal care and medical treatment when it is born. It also allows their names 
to go on the original birth records at the hospital and the governing department of 
health, avoiding the process of amending the birth certificate. 
b) The determination of parentage before birth allows the hospital to discharge the child 
directly to the intended parents rather than to the surrogate. 
c) From an emotional and psychological perspective, a pre-birth determination of 
parentage permits the intended parents to participate in the delivery and hospital 
experience as much like the natural delivery of their own child as possible. 
In Re Marriage of Moschetta98 California’s appeal court in its judgment demonstrates why 
a pre-birth order is more effective in the case of gestational surrogacy as opposed to 
traditional surrogacy. Robert and Cynthia Moschetta were a couple seeking to have their 
own child. However, Cynthia was sterile. In 1989 the Moschetta’s met with a surrogacy 
broker who introduced them to Elvira Jones. The parties signed an agreement to the effect 
that Elvira would be inseminated with Robert’s semen and in return she promised to sign 
all the necessary documents relinquishing her parental rights over the child that would be 
born. Elvira became pregnant around November of the same year, a time during which the 
Moschetta’s marriage began to experience problems. Elvira gave up custody of the child 
(Marissa) albeit reluctantly but by December of 1990, Robert had left the family residence 
with the baby Marissa and Cynthia had filed for divorce. She later filed a petition seeking 
to establish that she was Marissa’s de facto mother. Both women claimed to be Marissa’s 
mother. 
The court found that there were no competing presumptions of motherhood between Elvira 
and Cynthia since the latter wasn’t genetically linked to the child and neither did she give 
birth to her. Therefore, there was no dispute as to who the child’s legal mother was. The 
court concluded that pre-birth parentage determinations were permitted only for two 
genetically related intended parents who had valid presumptions for both motherhood and 
fatherhood. Cynthia had no other way of seeking custody of the child besides adoption. 
3.2.3. ISRAEL 
Israel only permits gestational surrogacy which guarantees that both commissioning 
parents are genetically related to the child. However, the process for transferring 
parenthood requires the involvement of a social worker. The social worker is nominated by 
                                                          




the Minister of Welfare as the child’s legal guardian while the intended parents go through 
an adoption procedure 99as prescribed by Israeli law.  
Towards the end of the fifth month of the surrogate’s pregnancy, the surrogate and 
commissioning couple are to notify the social worker of the birth place and estimated date 
of delivery. Within 24 hours after the delivery has taken place the social worker is to be 
notified. The surrogate then transfers the child to the custody of the commissioning couple 
in the presence of the social worker and will remain in their custody while the adoption is 
being processed.100 Following the court’s approval of the adoption request the 
commissioning parents will officially be recognized as the child’s parents. 
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Very recently, the surrogacy debate came to life in Kenya after AMN & 2 others v the AG was 
heard before the High Court. Not only did this case bring to life the continuance of surrogacy 
as a practice in Kenya but it also created awareness on the insufficiency of the legal and policy 
framework to deal with issues that may arise from such arrangements. 
Since the development of assisted reproductive technologies, this practice has evolved a great 
deal from the way it existed in the traditional African set up. This chapter will therefore focus 
on the practice of surrogacy in Kenya before and after the development of assisted reproductive 
technologies in the country while highlighting the Constitutional underpinnings of the right to 
assisted reproductive health and Parliament’s response to the growth of this practice. 
4.1. SURROGACY BEFORE AND AFTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Various communities had arrangements that ordinarily would be considered unusual in an 
attempt to alleviate the stigma associated with a woman’s infertility. Some of these include the 
Kipsigis, Suba and the Kikuyu. Some of these cases have been decided in court, most of the 
arising in succession matters. 
In Ezekiel Kiptarus Mutai v Esther Chepkurui Tapkile101 the dispute concerned the 
administration of the estate of the deceased named Tapkile Chesang. Ezekiel was her brother 
while Esther alleged that she was the deceased’s widow. According to Esther, she and the 
deceased had contracted a woman-to-woman marriage and had borne children for the deceased. 
The case sought to determine the validity of the marriage as well as whether or not the children 
had a right to inherit the deceased’s property. 
Reference was made to the work of Eugene Cotran. He described women-to-women marriages 
as a common phenomenon in some communities where a woman past child-bearing age and 
was either barren or had no sons may enter into a form of marriage with another woman. 
Usually this would happen where her husband had passed on. In order to ensure continuity with 
his bloodline, the widow would pay marriage consideration to the family of another woman 
after which she would be considered the ‘woman husband’ and the other woman would be her 
‘wife’. Thereafter, the woman husband would find a man within her husband’s clan to have 
sexual intercourse with the woman whose marriage consideration has been paid. Any children 
                                                          




resulting from such an arrangement are considered the children of the woman who paid the 
marriage consideration i.e. the woman husband. 
In another case Eunita Onyango Geko v Philip Obungu Orinda102the court encountered a 
similar problem. The applicant alleged that she had been married to the deceased (a woman) in 
a woman-to-woman marriage. The deceased had paid 9 cows as dowry to the applicant’s 
parents and she had since had 10 children all whom she claimed were the deceased’s. The court 
ruled in the applicant’s favour holding that under the Law of Succession Act section 29 the 
applicant and her children could be considered beneficiaries, thus they were entitled to inherit 
from the deceased’s estate. 
The court in Eliud Maina Mwangi v Margaret Wanjiru Gachangi103 had to determine whether 
the respondent was in fact the wife of the deceased or if she had lived with her merely as an 
employee. It was concluded that the existence of such marriage could only be evidenced by 
customary law through the fulfilment of any procedures or ceremonies which could further be 
corroborated by witnesses present at the time. In the case of Kikuyu custom, the ngurario, 
ruracio and dowry payment sufficiently evidence the existence of a woman-to-woman 
marriage. 
It is quite incredible that even in custom, communities thought it necessary to put in place 
processes to ensure that intention was formalized. Through this, the expected outcome of any 
transaction couldn’t be disputed and even if a dispute were to arise then there was evidence of 
parties’ intentions from the onset. 
The subject of assisted reproductive technologies didn’t feature much in Kenyan legal 
discourse until very recently. Much of the reporting has been left to newspapers and media 
houses. Nairobi IVF Clinic was the first medical centre in Kenya to provide IVF as an option 
for infertility treatment.104 However, there are about 6 fertility treatment centres.105 
The first surrogate birth in the country is reported to have taken happened in 2007.106 According 
to interviews with Nairobi IVF, between 2009 and 2012 20 couples commissioned other 
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women to carry their pregnancy for them with close to 30 babies being born by surrogate hosts 
within this period.107 This number has since increased and is expected to increase as the years 
go by especially since the cost of fertility treatment in Kenya is relatively lower than in most 
other countries.108 
4.2. LEGAL BASIS FOR SURROGACY: THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 
AND THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES BILL 
To begin with, the Constitution describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of 
society and the necessary basis of social order, enjoying the recognition and protection of the 
State.109 Article 43 further guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
including the right to healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare.110 These two 
provisions form the basis of the right to IVF and surrogacy as a form of reproductive 
mechanism, although not expressly stated. 
The cases JLN & 2 others v Director of Children’s Services111 and AMN & 2 others v AG112 
were the genesis of the discussion surrounding regulation of surrogacy. In both instances, the 
position in the Birth’s and Death’s Registration Act concerning legal parenthood was upheld. 
In the latter case, Justice Lenaola noted that the children were issued with birth certificates and 
passports listing the commissioning parents’ as the legal parents. He went on to state that the 
issuance of these documents was an error and contravention of the law although this was done 
in good faith. 
Parliament responded to the outcomes in these two cases by tabling what is currently known 
as the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill 2016. The Bill establishes the Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Authority charged with the responsibility to license facilities, 
educate members of the public on assisted reproductive technologies and maintain a database 
on persons who undergo or are born pursuant to assisted reproductive technologies among other 
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things.113 It has provisions on the requirements for facilities before they are granted licenses to 
administer assisted reproductive procedures and grounds for the revocation of the same.114  
It further outlines prohibited activities and offences linked with assisted reproductive 
technologies and provides for the circumstances following which people may pursue assisted 
reproductive technologies.115 In requiring the Authority to keep a register of persons who 
undergo ART, parliament has given an opportunity to persons who have been conceived by 
this means to retrieve information on their birth history.116 Part IV addresses the basic rights of 
donors, parents and children. 
When it comes to surrogate motherhood the Bill states: 
A woman of twenty-five years or more may, at the request of a couple, consent to a process of 
assisted reproduction for purposes of surrogate motherhood.117 
The surrogate mother shall carry the child on behalf of the parties to a marriage and shall 
relinquish all parental rights at birth over the child unless a contrary intention is proved.118 
Surrogacy agreements are recognised under the Bill and they are to be in the prescribed form, 
duly signed before any procedures are undertaken.119 The form is expected to have the names 
of the parents of the child to be born120 and shall serve as conclusive proof of parentage.121 
While Parliament’s attempts at forming this Bill are commendable, there is still much to be 
desired from it.  
4.2.1. LEGAL MOTHERHOOD 
The phrasing of the Bill points towards the affirmation of the intention of parties to a surrogacy 
arrangement.  Majority (if not all) of the time, parties expect that once a child is born they shall 
be handed over to the intended parents especially where the surrogate has no genetic 
relationship with the child. However, from previous discussions it is quite clear that by virtue 
of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, motherhood is still conferred upon the gestational 
carrier despite the parties’ intentions. It is not enough that the Bill demands that the child is 
handed over to the intended parents. In order for the intentions of the parties to be fulfilled, 
                                                          
113 Section 4, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
114 Section 5 and 6, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
115 Section 57, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
116 Part IV, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
117 Section 31 (1), Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
118 Section 31(2), Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
119 Section 32(1), Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 
120 Section 32 (2), Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill (2016). 




there still needs to be a way to vary or supersede the law on maternal rights as established by 
the usual law or regulation122 (in this case the Births and Deaths Registration Act). 
4.2.2. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE SURROGATE AND INTENDED MOTHER 
In general, the Bill seems not to foresee the likelihood of exploitation or manipulation of either 
party (particularly the surrogate). One of the greatest risks with surrogacy is the ease with which 
it can be commodified especially in the absence of stringent regulations that seek to protect 
both sides of the transaction.  
In the jurisdictions previously discussed, statute expressly sets out minimum requirements that 
must be met with regard to every surrogacy agreement. In my analysis, these have been geared 
largely towards the protection of the rights of the surrogate since the odds usually are that most 
women who choose to be surrogates come from humble backgrounds and they do so primarily 
for the financial gain their commitment offers. The contract should therefore contain provisions 
to the effect that: 
1. Payment of adequate/ reasonable medical and ancillary costs through insurance or other 
arrangements between the parties shall be guaranteed. 
2. The surrogate jointly with the intended couple should be the source of consent over 
clinical management and intervention of the pregnancy. 
3. The surrogate should have access to counselling services before during and after 
pregnancy to ensure that she is both physically and mentally capable of handling the 
pregnancy. 
4. The surrogate should undergo a medical examination before any ART procedure to 
ensure there is no risk posed to her life. 
5. Parties should ensure that the surrogate is properly informed of the procedure, its risks, 
the contractual terms and her consent should be obtained and given voluntarily by her. 
6. Once parenthood has been conferred on the intended parents it cannot be relinquished. 
The Baby Gammy Case is a perfect example of what could go wrong where the above 
conditions aren’t considered paramount or at least as a bare minimum in surrogacy contracts. 
The guarantee that the child will be handed over upon birth and the capping of monies payable 
to the surrogate are extremely important to ensure that the rights of the surrogate and those of 
the intended parents are balanced out.  
                                                          




4.2.3. LEGAL PROCESS OF CONFERRING MOTHERHOOD 
The most notable omission in the Bill is the lack of a process legally conferring motherhood 
on the commissioning mother. It would be risky and unreasonable to jump from an area once 
administered through the adoption process to one that appears to be administered by 
assumption. As was stated by Justice Lenaola, it is also unprocedural to simply fill in the names 
of the intended parents on the child’s birth certificate because legally the gestational carrier is 
still the child’s de facto mother. In Re Marriage of Moschetta123, the court further pointed out 
that the existence of a surrogacy agreement wasn’t sufficient to confer the status of a mother 
to another individual. 
Borrowing from California’s model, a pre-birth order seems more efficient especially where 
the intended parents are both genetic parents of the child. In making an application before the 
court, the agreement/ contract will have to be submitted first. Upon scrutiny, the court will then 
choose whether or not to issue an order establishing the parent-child relationship with the 
intended parents. The order may be presented before the medical facility where the child is 
expected to be born, the ART Authority and the Registrar of Births and Deaths. That way, the 
intended parents will have immediate and sole access to the child once it is born, their names 
will go on the hospital records and the child’s original birth records without requiring 
amendment, the child will be discharged from the hospital into the custody of its intended 
parents and finally it may enable the intended parents to participate in the delivery and hospital 
experience. 
In Florida and Virginia, there is a separation of the contractual process and the transfer of 
parenthood. The courts have to first approve of the contracts before parties proceed with ART 
treatments and the child’s parentage can only be transferred some time after birth. The 
separation of the two processes is unnecessary. This model of transfer in my opinion would be 
tedious and inefficient in the long run and beats the purpose of acknowledging the parties’ 
intention to begin with. 
The UK parental model is more or less like an adoption procedure which is also Israel’s 
preferred mode of transferring parentage. Adoption is relevant in situations where parenthood 
is being conferred upon persons who otherwise are not biologically related to the child in 
question. One would therefore ask if this procedure were suitable in cases where both parents 
are biologically related to the child (such as in surrogacy). Hence the need to have another legal 
process unlike adoption itself. 
                                                          





This chapter winds up the entire study. Here I shall review the different issues that have 
emerged in the paper in an attempt to summarize the ideas that have featured prominently. 
Lastly, I will conclude by highlighting various recommendations that seek to improve the 
regulation of surrogacy in Kenya while protecting the positions of both the surrogate and 
intended parents.  
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As demonstrated within this paper, before surrogacy questions on legal motherhood rarely 
featured in public discussions since it was assumed that when a woman was pregnant not only 
would she deliver the child on expiry of the 9 months anticipated, but by all means she would 
be genetically related to the child.  Surrogacy brought about a divide between the gestational 
and genetic functions of a mother.  
The United Kingdom chose to stick with the traditional presumption of motherhood thereby 
granting legal parenthood to the woman that ultimately delivers the baby. The same case 
applied in Israel even though both parents must be genetically related to the child. This position 
has served to protect the surrogate to a large extent. At the end of the day, parenthood must still 
be transferred through processes that are much like adoption. 
 The United States chose the contractual approach aimed at formalising the parties’ intention 
from the moment an agreement is procured between them. Whereas the law acknowledges the 
intended parents as the child’s legal parents, statute expressly gives a minimum set of terms 
that must be expressly stated within any surrogacy contract. This has gone a long way in 
balancing the rights of the surrogate, the intended parents together with the child. It is 
undeniable that pre-birth orders are more efficient and most suitable where both parents are 
genetically related to the child. Not only does it facilitate fluid transfer of custody but it also 
gives intended parents a chance to participate in the pregnancy process from beginning to end.  
Thus, in order to ensure the same efficiency I would propose the following practices within 
Kenya: 
That the Bill gives a bit more detail concerning a minimum set of terms that are to be included 
in every surrogacy agreement to avoid the likelihood of exploitation of either party and to make 




That pre-birth orders be introduced into Kenya’s legal system as a means to transfer parenthood 
since it would be faster, more efficient and would help authorities such as the ART Authority, 
the Registrar of Births and Deaths and the courts themselves to keep a clear record of 
surrogates, intended parents and their children. 
That surrogacy contracts should be scrutinized by the ART Authority to ensure that all parties 
have complied with the regulations set out with regard to payment, balancing of the rights of 
both parties, medical examinations, etc. This will also allow the courts to fast track the process 
of granting pre-birth orders once the contracts have already been approved by the ART 
Authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Surrogacy is a very delicate issue. Delicate because unlike ordinary transactions for the sale of 
goods and services, it demands full physical, emotional and psychological involvement by both 
parties. There is absolutely no way of creating legislation that will perfectly protect the 
emotional and psychological well-being of parties involved. However, this has never been the 
duty of the law, at least not in an absolute sense. One cannot completely separate gestational 
and genetic functions, neither can we apportion greater importance to one over the other. At 
the end of the day, for as long as the law has taken reasonable measures to safeguard the rights 
of both parties and hold either of them to account on failure to abide by the law, then that law 
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